Abstract-This paper studies the problem of secure communication over a wiretap channel p(y; z j x) with a secure feedback link of rate R f , where X is the channel input, and Y and Z are channel outputs observed by the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. It is shown that the secrecy capacity, the maximum data rate of reliable communication while the intended message is not revealed to the eavesdropper, is upper bounded as
By relaxing the secrecy requirement mildly while exploiting the better quality of the Alice-Bob channel than that of the Alice-Eve channel , Wyner showed that information can be transmitted securely at a positive rate, and characterized the secrecy capacity , the supremum of all achievable rates of secure communication, as (1) This result was later extended by Csiszár and Körner [3] to general broadcast channels with confidential messages. In particular, they showed that the secrecy capacity of the general (not necessarily degraded) wiretap channel is (2) Furthermore, it was shown that if the channel from Alice to Bob is more capable [4] than the channel from Alice to Eve, that is, if for all , then the secrecy capacity simplifies to (3) All scenarios described above deal with one-way communication between Alice and Bob. However, many common communication scenarios arise over inherently two-way channels, such as telephone systems, digital subscriber lines (DSL), cellular networks, satellite communications, and the Internet. Hence, it is natural to ask how possible interactions between Alice and Bob can increase the secrecy of their communication.
As a canonical model to study this question, this paper extends the wiretap channel model by introducing a secure feedback link of rate from Bob to Alice as depicted in Fig. 2 . The secure feedback link can be viewed as a primitive form of the backward channel from Bob to Alice with secrecy capacity , independent of the forward channel. Thus this model can provide insights into the value of two-way interactions in secure communication.
There are several concrete scenarios in which this model is applicable. For instance, consider the communication between a satellite (Alice) and a base station (Bob) on the ground. The satellite broadcasts its signal to the ground, so any (unintended) station can receive it. On the other hand, the base station can beamform some data back to the satellite securely, which can be used to enhance the secret data rate sent from the satellite to the base station.
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel as a function of the secure feedback rate
. In Theorem 1, we show the following 0018-9448/$26.00 © 2009 IEEE upper bound for a general wiretap channel with secure rate-limited feedback: (4) Due to the dependencies introduced by the feedback, proving the upper bound (4) requires a less standard treatment. We use a recursive argument, which helps to track the causal dependencies step by step and to obtain the desired single-letter characterization. Exploiting the recursive structure to find the singleletter characterization might be a powerful tool for similar problems.
For the case of a physically degraded wiretap channel , in which Eve receives a degraded version of what Bob receives, we show that the upper bound (4) is tight, establishing the secrecy capacity as (5) Interestingly, we show that in order to achieve the secrecy capacity for the physically degraded wiretap channel Bob can simply ignore what he receives and send "fresh" randomness. This fresh randomness plays the role of a secret key, which bridges Shannon's original result with Wyner's wiretap model. Accordingly, we use a variation of Wyner's original coding scheme which allows the use of a shared key (sent from Bob to Alice via rate-limited feedback). It should be noted that this modification has been already proposed by Yamamoto [5] and Merhav [6] , who characterized the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels with a shared key (which is already given prior to the communication) and also considered additional effects of having distortion or side information.
In a closely related work, Ahlswede and Cai [7] studied wiretap channels with secure output feedback, in which the channel output symbols received by Bob are fed back secretly to Alice. They showed that the secrecy capacity of the physically degraded wiretap channel with secure output feedback is (6) which is in general larger than the nonfeedback secrecy capacity (1) . At a first glance, it might seem contradictory that the optimal receiver should ignore the channel outputs completely when feedback is rate-limited (in the current paper) while the output feedback (in the Ahlswede-Cai setup) boosts the secrecy capacity as in (6) . A closer look, however, reveals that the Ahlswede-Cai coding scheme essentially extracts fresh randomness in the fed back output symbols hidden from Eve and uses that randomness as a key. Hence, the role of feedback for secure communication is providing shared randomness. Our result shows explicitly that when Bob has a means of interacting with Alice, he should allocate all resources to convey a key rather than sending back the channel output.
Recently, additional studies have been conducted on characterizing the secrecy capacity of various two-way communication systems. Lai, El Gamal, and Poor [8] studied the case of the modulo-additive wiretap channel, where Eve receives the modulo-sum of the source signal, the feedback signal, and the noise. They showed that if Bob jams Eve completely, then Alice can send messages securely at the capacity of the channel to Bob. Tekin and Yener [9] presented an achievable rate region for the two-way Gaussian wiretap channel. Similar to [8] , the model presented in [9] assumes that Eve receives the sum of signals from both transmitters corrupted by an additive Gaussian noise. They showed that due to the multiple access nature of Eve's channel, each transmitter can simultaneously help to hide the other user's message from Eve and send some data secretly to the other user. In both studies, the additive nature of Eve's channel gives the opportunity for jamming, in addition to possible backward information transfer. In comparison, our model decouples the forward and backward communication channels, eliminating the possible use of jamming, and rather focuses on the "inherent" value of the backward communication link. It also seems that having independent forward and backward communication links fits better the current practice of two-way communications over orthogonal media such as different frequency bands or time slots.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we give a formal statement of our result in Section II. Then, we show the upper bound on the secrecy capacity and the coding scheme in Sections III and IV, respectively. Section V concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM SETUP AND THE MAIN RESULT
We consider the communication problem depicted in Fig. 2 . Here Alice wishes to communicate a message index reliably to the legitimate receiver Bob over a wiretap channel , while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper Eve, where the channel input at time is received as and by Bob and Eve, respectively. To enhance the secrecy of the communication, Bob can send back symbols , over a feedback link of rate secret from Eve. The feedback symbol at time can depend causally on previous channel outputs and previous feedback symbols . We assume that the channel alphabets , and the feedback alphabets are finite, and Eve has complete knowledge of them and of the coding scheme used by Alice and Bob. The wiretap channel is memoryless, i.e.
for . More formally, we define a code as 1) feedback alphabets such that their cardinalities satisfy (7) 2) stochastic encoding maps consisting of conditional probability distributions , defined for each and (in other words, denotes the probability that the message , the previous sent symbols and the previously received feedback symbols are mapped to the channel input at time ); 3) stochastic feedback maps consisting of conditional probability distributions (by convention, independent of ); and 4) a decoding map resulting in the decoded message (8) We assume throughout that the message is a random variable uniformly distributed over . Given a code, we define the probability of error as and the secrecy leakage rate as The proof is given in Section III.
Theorem 2:
The secrecy capacity of the physically degraded wiretap channel with rate-limited feedback is
The converse follows immediately from Theorem 1. A capacity-achieving coding scheme is presented in Section IV, in which Bob sends back pure randomness securely at rate , and Alice uses that shared randomness as a secret key to increase the secrecy rate.
Example 1: Consider the degraded wiretap channel shown in Fig. 3 , which is a cascade of two binary symmetric channels, BSC and BSC . By symmetry, the input distribution achieves the maximization in , and with this distribution we have where is the binary entropy function and . From Theorem 2, we have Fig. 4 shows the plot of , which starts from and increases linearly with until it gets saturated at , for feedback rate . Let be the input power constraint. Then we know [10] that (12) where the maximum is attained by . For the secrecy capacity without feedback we know [11] that (13) where the maximum is attained again with . While we will not provide a detailed argument, it is straightforward to show that Theorem 2 can be modified for additive Gaussian noise channels to give (14) Fig. 6 . An example of a degraded wiretap channel whose secrecy capacity is sublinear in the feedback rate.
Since the maxima in (12) and (13) are achieved by the same distribution, it can be verified that the maximum in (14) is also achieved by and the secrecy capacity with ratelimited feedback is (15) Similar to Fig. 4 in the previous example, starts from and increases linearly with until it gets saturated at for feedback rate . As we saw in the previous examples, when the same input distribution maximizes and , the maximum and the minimization in can be exchanged. Therefore and one bit secure feedback is worth one bit in the secrecy capacity until we get saturated by the capacity of the channel between Alice and Bob. However, this is not always true. In fact, could be strictly sublinear in ; namely, as shown in the following example.
Example 3: Consider the degraded wiretap channel shown in Fig. 6 . By symmetry, the distribution and achieves the maximum in (11) . It is easy to verify that with this input distribution we have (16) (17)
It follows that (18) Fig. 7 shows the plot of , which increases sublinearly with until it gets saturated at for feedback rate .
III. PROOF OF THE UPPER BOUND
In this section we show that if the secrecy rate is achievable, then must satisfy (19) To show (19) we prove the following two upper bounds for any achievable secrecy rate :
where as . Then we use the usual technique of introducing a time sharing random variable [10] , and concavity of mutual information in to obtain (19). First, (20) follows easily from Fano's inequality as in the standard converse proof of the channel coding theorem [10, Theorem 7.7.1].
We now prove (21) using Fano's inequality, the secrecy constraint (10) , and the feedback rate-limit constraint (7). A recursive argument (Lemma 1) is then used to obtain the single-letter characterization.
By Fano's inequality, we have
By the assumption that , we have as . From (8) Starting from (26), we apply Lemma 1 recursively to find the single-letter characterization as follows: (33) Dividing (33) by and applying the feedback rate-limit constraint (7) we obtain (21) as follows:
To complete the proof, let be a time-sharing random variable distributed uniformly over and independent of . Then (21) Combining (36) and (37), we have for some consistent with the given channel . Therefore, we conclude that which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. A CAPACITY-ACHIEVING SCHEME FOR DEGRADED CHANNELS
In this section, for the sake of completeness, we present a coding scheme for the degraded wiretap channel with rate-limited feedback that achieves any secrecy rate satisfying
The coding scheme is based on a variation of Wyner's original scheme which allows the use of a shared key, and originally was proposed by Yamamoto [5] . Ahlswede and Cai [7] use a similar idea to enhance the secrecy rate after generating secret common randomness through feedback.
We assume Bob uses the feedback link only to send back a secret key of rate at the first instance; i.e., send drawn uniformly from , so that Alice and Bob have a shared key prior to their communication as shown in Fig. 8 . In the remainder, we will provide a coding scheme for the wiretap channel with shared key of rate that achieves any secrecy rate satisfying (38).
Fix any distribution and define (39) and (40) Let , where and are independent random variables uniformly distributed over and , respectively. As shown below, the message will be transmitted securely using Wyner's original coding scheme while the security of will be guaranteed by using a key of rate . Note that from (38), (39) and (40) we have
The codebook is a collection of codewords , from which the specific codeword is picked randomly so as to confuse the eavesdropper. Therefore, there is no predefined codeword for a specific message.
Codebook generation. Pick , such that for some . Such always exists since . Generate a random codebook containing independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random codewords , each drawn according to . Divide the codebook into disjoint sub-codebooks, each of which has codewords. Label the sub-codebooks . Now, divide each sub-codebook into sections , each of which has codewords. Enumerate the codewords in each section from to , so the codewords in the th section of the th sub-codebook can be called as (see Fig. 9 ). Feedback. Let be uniform over . Bob sends at time .
Encoding. We use as a key shared between Alice and Bob. Generate a new variable , where is the modulo addition over the set . Note that and are uniformly distributed and pairwise independent, so is uniformly distributed and independent of both and . We pick as follows. According to we pick the corresponding sub-codebook among ones. In that sub-codebook we pick one of the sections uniformly at random and in that section we pick the corresponding codeword among the codewords according to . We denote by the index of the picked codeword in the subcodebook . Decoding. The decoder looks for a unique index such that , where is the set of jointly typical sequences. If no such exists or if there is more than one such, an error is declared. Having found , the decoder finds the reconstructed message as follows. It chooses as the index of the sub-codebook belongs to. For , the decoder first finds , the index of in the section it belongs to, and then it finds , where is the modulo subtraction over . Analysis of the error probability and the secrecy. We show that there exists a codebook in the random collection of codebooks for which (9) and (10) are simultaneously satisfied; i.e., and . Let and be the probability of error and the secrecy leakage rate corresponding to a specific codebook . Since , by the channel coding theorem [10, Theorem 7.7.1] we have (41) where the expectation is over all random codebooks. As shown below as (
Combining (41) and (42), we have as (
Therefore, there exists at least one codebook for which conditions (9) and (10) (45) where (45) follows from the fact that is independent of for any choice of . This follows since is independent of due to the independent and uniformly distributed key , and form a Markov chain.
To complete the analysis, we show that as . Recall is a random variable over that denotes the index of the picked codeword in the sub-codebook . Based on the encoding scheme, is uniformly distributed and independent of . Then it follows that (46) To summarize, we showed that as , and hence by Lemma 2, condition (42) holds. Putting (41) and (42) together, we can conclude that there exists at least one codebook which satisfies conditions (9) and (10) simultaneously. This completes the proof.
Remark: This coding scheme can be easily modified to the case in which the feedback channel has a time-invariant rate constraint for all . By using block Markov coding, we can send the key in the -th block that will be used in the -th block.
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the wiretap channel with a secure rate-limited feedback link and found an upper bound for the secrecy capacity as a function of the feedback rate. The upper bound is achievable in the case of the physically degraded wiretap channel. To achieve the secrecy capacity in this case, Bob ignores the channel output and simply sends back pure randomness, which is used by Alice as a key. To position this result along Ahlswede and Cai's result [7] , suppose that the feedback rate is sufficiently large to send back the entire channel output itself, say, (or even ). Our result shows that when Bob has an option to choose an arbitrary (stochastic) feedback mapping rather than passively repeating what he has received, the trivial scheme of sending an independently generated secret key is sufficient to achieve the secrecy capacity. In other words, in contrast to the case of [7] where the feedback (output symbols) is only partially useful for a key, the freedom to choose what to send back allows for full utilization of the feedback data rate . Using the same idea of the achievability it can be shown that for any wiretap channel where . In general, this is smaller than the upper bound in Theorem 1, and the problem of closing the gap for the wiretap channel models other than the (physically) degraded ones remains open for future studies. 
